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The Fact-Law Distinction: Strategic Factfinding and
Lawmaking in a Judicial Hierarchy
Sepehr Shahshahani*
Fordham Law School
A fundamental but understudied procedural institution of American law is that
appellate courts defer more to trial courts’ findings of fact than to their conclu-
sions of law. I formally model this procedural institution, showing how trial
courts use factfinding to achieve their preferred outcome and how appellate
courts craft rules in anticipation of trial courts’ strategic factfinding. Trial
courts do not always report facts truthfully. Appellate courts do not commit
to consistent rules, but consistent rules may emerge in equilibrium, creating
a misleading appearance of judicial commitment to legal consistency.
Preference divergence between trial and appellate courts has a nonmono-
tonic effect on factfinding. Fact deference can explain suboptimal rulemaking
and reversals even when there is no uncertainty about the likelihood of review
or the reviewing court’s ideal rule. The model is also useful in understanding
why the institution of fact deference persists. Applications to policing and
other domains are discussed. (JEL K40, K41, D02)
1. Introduction
The literature on judicial politics focuses mostly on supreme and appellate
courts and their interaction, but the vast majority of judicial activity in the
nation takes place at trial courts and their interaction with intermediate
appellate courts (e.g., Administrative Office of the US Courts, Federal
Judicial Caseload Statistics 2017). The work of trial courts is both distinct-
ive and important. Whereas appellate courts decide discrete issues arising
in a case, trial courts manage the whole case, shepherding the parties
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through litigation from when the complaint is filed to when the remedy or
sentence is determined, in the process retaining substantial discretion over
many important decisions. As the celebrated trial judge Charles Wyzanski
wrote to his Senator when declining a nomination to the First Circuit
Court of Appeals (quoted in Murphy et al. 2006: 113–114),
The District Court gives more scope to a judge’s initiative and
discretion. His width of choice in sentencing defendants is the
classic example. But there are many other instances. In civil
litigation a District Judge has a chance to help the lawyers
frame the issues and develop the facts so that there may be
a meaningful and complete record. He may innovate proce-
dures promoting fairness, simplification, economy, and
expedition. . .. The District Judge so often has the last word.
Even where he does not, heed is given to his estimates of cred-
ibility, his determination of the facts, his discretion in framing
or denying relief upon the facts he found.
This article is about a chief source of trial judges’ discretion—the defer-
ential standard of review of trial courts’ findings of fact. When a decision
is appealed, trial courts’ legal determinations are reviewed de novo—liter-
ally, “anew,” meaning the appellate court decides the issue according to
its own best legal interpretation, without deference to the decision below.
In contrast, factual determinations are reviewed under the “clear error”
standard, meaning the appellate court defers to the trial court’s determin-
ation and does not overturn it unless clearly incorrect. Reversal is war-
ranted under the clear-error standard only if the reviewing court “is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”
(Easley v. Cromartie, 532U.S. 234, 235 (2001)). Factual determinations
are thus reviewed “with a serious thumb on the scale” in favor of the fact-
finder (U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 138
S. Ct. 960, 966 (2018)). (Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed
under the clear-error standard or de novo depending on whether factual or
legal issues predominate (Village at Lakeridge, 138 S. Ct. at 966–67).)
Clear-error review of factual determinations, as contrasted with de novo
review of legal rulings, is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rule 52(a)(6)), as well as federal and state caselaw,1 and applies in both
civil and criminal proceedings. As such, it is a fundamental procedural
feature of the American judicial system.2
1. See, e.g., People v. Louis, 728 P.2d 180, 189 (1986) (California); Guzman v. State, 955
S.W.2d 85, 87 (1997) (Texas); In re Cross, 327 P.3d 660, 673 (2014) (Washington); Casavant
v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 952 N.E.2d 908, 911 (2011) (Massachusetts).
2. In addition to clear error and de novo review, appellate courts use the “abuse of dis-
cretion” standard when reviewing certain determinations made by trial courts. For the sorts
of determinations that are the focus of this article—that is, questions of law or fact or mixed
questions of law and fact—the abuse of discretion standard merges into either clear error or
de novo review. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) (“When
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This procedural institution has important real-world implications. Trial
judges engage in factfinding in many contexts. They find facts in bench tri-
als. More commonly, they find facts in conjunction with making legal
determinations. For example, criminal defendants often bring a motion to
suppress evidence on the grounds that it was illegally obtained, and in
deciding the legal question of whether the evidence should be suppressed
the trial court first has to determine the facts of how the police got the evi-
dence (see Section 4). Judge-made factual determinations also pervade
legal determinations in patent law (see Section 5), trademarks, antitrust,
bankruptcy, contracts, and many other areas.3
The justifications commonly given for deferential review of factual
judgments are that trial judges are better positioned to assess witness cred-
ibility, and that conducting a fresh round of factfinding every time a case
is appealed would be immensely costly to the judicial system. (Appellate
hearings consist of lawyers’ arguments, not presentation of evidence and
witness testimony.) Whatever the merits of these justifications, the more
interesting question from the perspective of positive social science is how
this procedural institution structures the strategic interaction of trial and
appellate courts.
I present a formal model to explore the implications of deferential fact
review for factfinding and rulemaking in a judicial hierarchy. The model
takes clear-error review seriously by requiring the appellate court to defer
to the trial court’s factual determinations as long as they fall within certain
bounds. This deference gives the trial court, which knows more than the
appellate court about the facts, some discretion in factfinding, which it can
use strategically to obtain its preferred outcome in a case. If the appellate
court believes that the trial court is using its discretion to distort the facts,
then it can distort applicable law to compensate. But, distorting the law is
costly because it establishes a bad guide for future cases and conduct. So
the appellate court must probabilistically trade off the present benefits of
correctly deciding the case against the future costs of fixing a bad rule.
The model shows that, given deferential fact review and the trial court’s
informational advantage, the trial court will not always truthfully report
case facts. Nor will the appellate court employ a consistent rulemaking
strategy, in the sense of committing to the same rule (e.g., its ideal point);
rather, the appellate court threatens rule distortion in response to certain
an appellate court reviews a district court’s factual findings, the abuse of discretion and
clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable.”); Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme
Court, 80 F.3d 633, 637 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that although, “technically,” the applicable
standard of review is abuse of discretion, an “essentially legal determination” made by the
district court must be reviewed de novo). But, in other contexts—such as case management,
admission of evidence, and determination of remedies, sentences, or sanctions—the abuse
of discretion standard might be meaningfully different. Formal analysis of those contexts
seems promising for future inquiry.
3. Factfinding by trial judges should not be confused with factfinding by juries at trial,
which is an entirely separate topic and outside the scope of this article.
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factual determinations by the trial court. Nevertheless, in the pure-
strategy equilibrium, the rule always ends up at the appellate court’s ideal
point. The fact that off-path rule distortion is not empirically observable
creates the impression of judicial commitment to legal consistency, but the
model shows that there will be no such commitment.
The mixed-strategy equilibrium shows how fact discretion can lead to
rules that both courts dislike (Pareto-dominated rules). It also shows why
the trial court may be reversed even in the absence of uncertainty about
the appellate court’s ideal rule or the likelihood of review.
The model produces interesting comparative statics. Factfinding increases
in the trial court’s valuation of a case’s importance and in how fact-intensive
the case is, and decreases in the appellate court’s valuation of case import-
ance and the trial court’s cost of factfinding. Less intuitively, preference di-
vergence between the courts has a nonmonotonic effect on factfinding.
Comparing the American judicial system to one without deferential fact
review shows that the institution of deference benefits appellate courts if
and only if their preferences are closely aligned with trial courts. This sug-
gests that understanding why the institution persists requires looking be-
yond the familiar story that the principal voluntarily delegates discretion
to elicit the agent’s greater effort.
2. Relation to Literature
This article builds on the formal literature on judicial hierarchy [see
Kastellec (2017) for an overview]. I employ the “case space” framework,
described in Section 3.1, which has become standard in the literature
[Kornhauser (1992) Lax (2011)]. A prominent virtue of the case space ap-
proach is that it distinguishes courts’ dispute-settling and rulemaking func-
tions while showing how the functions are linked. My model focuses on a
potential tradeoff between these two considerations.
I also adopt from the literature a principal-agent perspective with a
focus on informational asymmetries between lower courts (LCs) and
higher courts (HCs). But, unlike most of the literature, this is not an audit-
ing model. The focus on auditing goes back to an influential article by
Cameron et al. (2000). In that model, some case facts are “public,” observ-
able to both the HC and LC, and some are “private,” observable to the
LC but not to the HC unless it decides to pay the cost of reviewing the
case. The heart of the analysis is whether the HC audits the LC. A similar
theme pervades subsequent literature. For example, Lax (2003) relaxes the
assumption that the HC is a unitary actor to investigate the impact of the
“rule of four” on the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions; Carrubba and
Clark (2012) and Clark and Carrubba (2012) explore judicial utility func-
tions defined not only over dispositions but also over rules and opinion
quality; Beim et al. (2014) investigate how “whistleblowing” by a LC
judge (or a nonjudicial actor like the Solicitor General) can help HCs in-
duce LC compliance; Badawi and Baker (2015) investigate why appellate
courts spend resources on developing precedent rather than issuing
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summary orders. Each of these works enriches our understanding of judi-
cial politics by exploring new territory. One feature they have in common,
though, is that they are about a principal deciding whether to audit an
agent. What makes the wheels turn in each of these models is the cost of
review, which the principal can pay and learn the facts, or not pay and be
free of the cost but ignorant of the facts.
The auditing metaphor is a good way of capturing the logic of what one
might call “second-level” review—that is, a supreme court’s review of ap-
pellate court decisions (as well as en banc review in federal circuit courts).
But it is not a good fit for “first-level” review—that is, intermediate appel-
late court review of trial court decisions—because in that context the HC
is required to hear all appeals (appeal “as of right”). My model captures
this (more common) setting.
Outside the case space framework, there is a rich literature on judicial
discretion. Tiller and Spiller (1999) discuss an agent’s choice between low-
cost and high-cost instruments. They note that the agent might choose a
high-cost instrument (despite its cost) if doing so would discourage moni-
toring by the principal, and they provide interesting illustrations from ad-
ministrative agencies. Empirically investigating judicial discretion in
criminal sentencing, Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) note that trial courts’
factual determinations are reviewed with greater deference than legal deter-
minations, and Fischman and Schanzenbach (2012) discuss various stand-
ards of review under the US Sentencing Guidelines. Jacobi and Tiller
(2007) and Cross et al. (2012) note that trial courts have greater discretion
when the law is standard-like than when it is rule-like, and draw interesting
implications for appellate courts’ choice of rules versus standards.
This literature makes an important contribution in integrating the
nuances of legal doctrine into an analysis of political control. Taking that
lesson to heart, the present article contributes to this literature by rigor-
ously formalizing the strategic interaction and standards of review. I sub-
stitute a full game in place of informal or decision-theoretic approaches.
This allows me, as the forthcoming propositions will show, to precisely de-
rive additional results, uncover the mechanisms driving the results, adjudi-
cate between observationally equivalent explanations, and use
comparative statics. Tiller and Spiller (1999) also include a fully specified
game, but there is no informational asymmetry in that game—which is
critical in analyzing an institution of deference predicated on trial courts’
superior access to factual information. Moreover, by distinguishing rules
and dispositions, the case space approach permits a richer domain of judi-
cial lawmaking than a binary choice of policies.
More recently, Hübert (2019) and Baker and Kornhauser (2017) have
modeled first-level review. Like this article, these works formally analyze
appellate courts’ deference to trial courts. But they take “deference” to
mean simply affirming a judgment, and there are no standards of review
in the models. Lax (2012) also studies strategic rulemaking, including an
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interesting comparison of rules and standards, but does not model LCs as
strategic actors.
Gennaioli and Shleifer (2008) also model judicial fact discretion. Their
focus, however, is welfare analysis of optimal tort damages, not principal-
agent relations in the judicial hierarchy. A number of strong assump-
tions—such that there is no limit to trial judges’ ability to manipulate facts
without fear of reversal, and that there is nothing appellate courts can do
about trial courts’ factfudging—take out the element of strategic inter-
action. When the law is settled, analysis of what trial judges will do is
reduced to a simple optimization problem (pp. 9, 16). Even when the law
is unsettled, Gennaioli and Shleifer assume away much that is of strategic
interest by effectively assuming that the appellate court must believe the
facts reported by the trial court—the appellate court’s utility is calculated
as if the reported facts are true (p. 18). These assumptions are appropriate
in light of the authors’ focus, but my focus on strategic principal-agent
interactions demands an entirely different approach. I allow appellate
courts’ beliefs about true facts to be informed by their knowledge of the
possibility of trial judges’ factfudging. Moreover, appellate courts can do
something about factfudging by making rules that take its possibility into
account. The contribution is thus to explicitly model a deferential but not
toothless standard of review, and to embed that standard within a game-
theoretic analysis of strategic interaction between trial and appellate
courts where incomplete information plays an important role.
3. Model
3.1 Illustrative Example
The model employs the “case space” framework. Here, a case is a point in
fact space (usually R, but in principle Rn), a disposition is a binary measure
of the outcome of the case, and a rule is a hyperplane dividing the fact space
into half spaces corresponding to the two dispositions.4 To take a simple ex-
ample, a speed limit of 65mph assigns the “violation” disposition to cases
above 65 and the “no violation” disposition to cases below 65.
I introduce fact discretion to the case space framework, showing how
factfinding deference gives trial courts opportunities both to deceive and
to help appellate courts. A key driver of strategic interaction in the model
is preference divergence between trial and appellate courts. A trial court
who disagrees with the appellate court about the law, and who therefore
cannot reach its desired outcome under the actual facts of a case, might be
able to obtain its preferred outcome by reporting alternative facts.
Continuing with the speeding example, suppose the trial court’s preferred
speed limit is 60 and the appellate court’s is 50, and the defendant was
driving at 52. The trial court wants to find the defendant not guilty but
4. It is possible to conceive of more complicated rules, but this article, like most others,
focuses on cutpoint rules.
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cannot do so by deciding that the speed limit is 60 (a legal determination);
however, the trial court might be able to obtain its preferred disposition,
even under the appellate court’s preferred speed limit, if it finds that the
defendant was driving at 48 (a factual determination).
But, the appellate court is not helpless in the face of factfinding. If the
appellate court thinks the trial court is fudging, it can nullify the disposi-
tional effect of the trial court’s factfinding by changing the speed limit to
(just below) 48. But moving the rule is costly for the appellate court, who
cares not just about getting this case right but also about setting the right
speed limit to govern future cases and conduct. Both elements of this sim-
ple example—the trial court’s use of fact discretion to obtain its preferred
disposition, and the appellate court’s tradeoff between disposition and
rule utility—are essential in the formal model.
3.2 Setup
A case is decided by a two-level judicial hierarchy (trial and intermediate
appellate courts). The appellate court knows the neighborhood of true
facts but not their precise location. The trial court, given its closer engage-
ment with the case and sometimes with live witnesses, knows the true facts
(equivalently interpreted as a best estimate of the true facts). The trial
court reports some facts to the appellate court. As long as these facts are
within the aforementioned neighborhood, they are not “clearly
erroneous” and must be taken as the operative facts of the case. The ap-
pellate court then chooses a rule, which determines the disposition of the
case based on the trial court’s reported facts. Each court wants to get the
correct disposition in this case (according to its own ideal rule) and to set
the rule close to its ideal point (for future, unmodeled, cases).
Formally, a LC (with ideal point L) and a HC (with ideal pointH, both
ideal points being common knowledge) interact as follows:
1. Nature selects the true case facts (ft 2 R) and a signal of case
facts (f 2 R). LC observes both ft and f, but HC observes only
f: HC knows that true case facts are uniformly distributed on an
-ball around the signal:
ðftjf ¼ xÞ  U½x ; xþ  8x;
2. LC chooses what facts to report, f 0. LC may simply report the
signal f, a decision represented by u ¼ 0, or it may decide at cost
c to deviate from the signal, denoted u ¼ 1, in which case it can
report f 0 2 ½f ; fþ . LC also announces a (provisional) rule
r‘, which determines a (provisional) disposition as follows:
d‘ ¼
1 if f 0 < r‘
0 if f 0  r‘
;

3. HC announces the final rule r, which determines the disposition
as follows:
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d ¼ 1 if f
0 < r
0 if f 0  r :

Payoffs are:
ULC ¼ jr Lj þ e‘ 1ðd ¼ dLÞ  cuþ a 1ðr ¼ r‘Þ (1)
UHC ¼ jrHj þ eh 1ðd ¼ dHÞ (2)
where dL ¼
1 if ft < L
0 if ft  L

and dH ¼
1 if ft < H
0 if ft  H

.
A strategy for LC is the choice of a triplet ðr‘;u; f 0Þ given the public signal
and the true facts (rLC : R ½f ; fþ  ! R f0; 1g ½f ; fþ ). A
strategy for HC is the choice of a rule r given the public signal and LC’s fact-
finding (rHC : R f0; 1g  ½f ; fþ  ! R). Players are expected-utility
maximizers. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Without
loss of generality, assume L > H and H ¼ 0.
Here is an explanation of the legal and strategic substance behind the
model.
3.2.1 First Stage. This stage captures the trial court’s information advan-
tage over the appellate court. The public signal f can be interpreted as
some core factual information about the case that is equally accessible to
both courts and not manipulable by the trial court (e.g., a police report
indicating how fast someone was driving, information about a company’s
stock prices on a given day, a hospital bill showing medical expenses).
Such core public facts are informative of the true case facts, but not per-
fectly informative. How informative they are is measured by . A larger 
denotes a fact-intensive issue, meaning the outcome hinges on specific
facts beyond the public record (e.g., witness credibility); a smaller 
denotes an issue where the public record is largely self-sufficient.5
3.2.2 Second Stage. This stage captures the trial court’s bounded discre-
tion in factfinding. Restricting f 0 to an -neighborhood of f gives content
to the idea of clear error—beyond a limit, factual determinations become
clearly erroneous. Naturally, the parameter () that signifies how well the
public record reflects the true facts also delimits how far the trial court
may depart from the public record. I will sometimes refer to the decision
to depart from the public record (f 0 6¼ f) as “factfinding” or “costly
factfinding.” The cost (c) reflects the extra work that the trial court must
do to justify reported facts that are different from what the appellate court
5. The uniform distribution for ft was chosen for mathematical convenience; any distri-
bution supported on a bounded interval symmetric around f would provide qualitatively
similar results. No restrictions are necessary on the distribution of f (beyond being continu-
ous and supported at least on an -ball around H) for deriving equilibria. When the direc-
tion of comparative statics depended on the distribution, I assumed naturally that f is
distributed uniformly over a large interval aroundH.








 School Library user on 19 O
ctober 2021
can directly see—for example, by writing a more elaborately fact-laden
opinion, or by holding a hearing with witnesses on a criminal defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence rather than deciding the motion “on the
papers.”6 Note that, in the model, “factfinding” does not signify a more
thorough search to learn the facts. (The trial court also selects a rule (r‘),
which is required to decide the case at this stage. This rule selection is a
legal determination and thus receives no deference.)
3.2.3 Third Stage. The game concludes by the appellate court announcing
the rule r, which determines the disposition as per the case space approach
(section 3.1): Cases below r receive one disposition (d¼ 1), and cases
above r get another disposition (d¼ 0).7 Note that r generates a dispos-
ition by reference to case facts as reported by the trial court (f 0). That the
appellate court must accept the trial court’s factual report captures the
deferential standard of review—as long as the reported facts are within
the neighborhood of the public signal where the truth could be, the trial
court’s factual determination is not directly reversible.
3.2.4 Payoffs. Both courts’ payoffs have a rule component and a dispos-
ition component. The disposition component captures each court’s desire
to get this case right; the rule component captures the desire to fix the right
rule to govern future cases and future conduct. The rule payoff is a linear
loss function of distance between the final rule and a court’s ideal rule.
(Quadratic loss would work too.)8 The disposition payoff is e
(e‘ for LC and eh forHC), which accrues if and only if the case’s dispos-
ition conforms to a court’s ideal disposition. Ideal dispositions, denoted
dL and dH, are the dispositions demanded by each court’s ideal rule under
the true case facts. (HC never learns the truth, so its disposition payoff is
in the form of expected utility.) LC’s utility function also incorporates a
payoff for getting affirmed on appeal (a) and a cost (c) for going beyond
the public signal. To avoid the trivial equilibrium where there is no fact-
finding motivated by the desire to flip a case’s disposition, I focus on cases
where LC’s benefit from obtaining its preferred disposition exceeds the
cost of factfinding (e‘ > c).
6. Analytically, the main use of the cost parameter is to rule out reported facts that are
not dispositionally different from f. Eliminating the parameter would not meaningfully
change the results.
7. The rule r chosen byHC is best interpreted generally as the choice of a law or legal re-
gime, rather than specifically as a choice between rules and standards, though, given its de-
terminacy, r is more like a rule than a standard. The rules-versus-standards discussion is
ubiquitous in legal literature [see Shahshahani (2015): 283–285, for a survey].
8. The rule payoff can be microfounded by imagining a multiperiod or infinite horizon
game, with factfinding in every period, where the rule is fixed in the first period and cases
are decided in subsequent periods by reference to that rule. Each new legal issue has one
such game associated with it.
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3.2.5 Alternative Specifications. The results derived below are robust to
certain alternative specifications. In the model LC is restricted to choosing
f 0 2 BðfÞ. A more complicated model, where LC is allowed to set f 0 any-
where but f 0 62 BðfÞ is clearly erroneous and thus reversible by HC, is eas-
ily reducible to the present model because f 0 62 BðfÞ is dominated. In
addition, the rulemaking component of LC’s strategy (the choice of r‘)
and the affirmance payoff (a) are added to capture institutional details,
and are not essential to the analysis. The core strategic interaction is LC’s
factfinding and how HC responds to it.
Before solving the game, a word about its connection to well-known
classes of signaling games may be useful [see Sobel (2009) for a concise
survey]. My model resembles cheap talk models in that the sender’s mes-
sage contains no verifiable information and the divergence of sender-re-
ceiver preferences drives strategic behavior. Some results accordingly
have a cheap talk flavor. For example, the result that trial courts will
not always report case facts truthfully (Remark 1 below) resembles the
seminal result in Crawford and Sobel (1982) that perfect information
transmission is not possible unless the sender and receiver have identical
preferences. But my model is not a cheap talk model. To begin, signaling
is costly—the trial court pays in effort (c) to report facts beyond the
public signal. More importantly (given that similar results would go
through without c), the trial court’s factual report is not only a signal
about the state of the world but also binding on the appellate court. The
deferential standard of review has purchase. The appellate court cannot
simply ignore the trial court’s (not clearly-erroneous) factual findings if
it does not believe them; it must pay a cost in rule distortion to nullify
their effect. That the sender’s message both serves as strategic informa-
tion transmission and must be taken as true (even if not believed) is a
distinctive feature of the model.
3.3 Fact Distortion and Varieties of Factfinding
It is useful to begin the analysis by asking whether there are any equilibria
in which the trial court always reports the true facts. The answer is no. If
LC always tells the truth then HC always sets the rule at its ideal point.
But then, if the two courts’ ideal dispositions differ (i.e., ft 2 ½0;LÞ) and
LC can move the facts from one side of HC’s ideal point to the other (i.e.,
f 2 ½0; Þ), LC has a profitable deviation from truthtelling (Figure 1). This
result is formalized in Remark 1.9
Remark 1. There is no equilibrium in which LC always reports the true
facts. Formally, there is no equilibrium in which signff 0g ¼ signfftg 8f.
The remark helps build intuition for why LC might choose to bear the
cost of reporting facts other than the public signal. It is useful to distin-
guish two varieties of factfinding, which I call “helpful” and “deceptive.”
9. Proofs omitted from the main text are in the appendix.
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Helpful factfinding occurs when LC uses its factfinding power to report
case facts that are on the same side of HC’s ideal point as the true case
facts (formally, u ¼ 1 and signff 0g ¼ signfftg). Such factfinding can help
both LC and HC when their preferred dispositions are the same but the
public signal misrepresents the location of true case facts in relation to
HC’s ideal point, as in Figure 2. (Notice that subfigures (a) and (b) are
possible only if L < , meaning ideal points are close together.) In con-
trast, deceptive factfinding (or “factfudging”) occurs when LC uses its
factfinding power to misrepresent the location of facts with respect to
HC’s ideal point (formally, u ¼ 1 and signff 0g 6¼ signfftg). Under fact-
fudging, HC’s choice of its ideal rule would give LC its preferred dispos-
ition to the detriment of HC (Figure 1).
Truthfulness is defined in Remark 1 as signff 0g ¼ signfftg. This is a le-
nient definition: It requires not literal truthfulness (i.e., f 0 ¼ ft) but simply
an accurate report of whether the facts fall to the left or right of HC’s ideal
point, which is all that is required for HC to get its ideal disposition under
its ideal rule. Unfortunately for HC, Remark 1 rules out truthful equili-
bria even under this lenient definition. (A fortiori, literal truthfulness will
also not occur in equilibrium.)
Building on this intuition, it is useful to ask when LC does not have an
incentive to report facts other than the public signal. The answer is: for
very easy cases. If the public signal is sufficiently far from HC’s ideal point
(f   or f  ), then HC knows on which side of its ideal point the true
case facts fall, and LC’s fact report cannot move the facts from one side of
HC’s ideal point to the other. So HC would obtain is preferred disposition
by choosing its ideal rule, which also uniquely maximizes its rule utility.
Therefore, r¼ 0 must be chosen in equilibrium—regardless of the facts
reported by LC. Factfinding in such a situation would be pure cost for
LC, with no prospect of changing the ultimate rule or disposition, so it
would not occur. The result is formalized as follows.
Remark 2. In very easy cases, LC will not report facts other than the
public signal. Formally, if f   or f   then u ¼ 0 in equilibrium.
Figure 1. Deceptive Factfinding.
When HC sets the rule at its ideal point (r¼0), setting f 0 as shown helps LC get its pre-
ferred disposition, to the detriment of HC.
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3.4 Rule Distortion
Next, consider whether HC would always set the rule at its ideal point.
This would be HC’s strictly dominant strategy in a game without fact dis-
cretion. Even with fact discretion, considering that LC receives no defer-
ence in rulemaking, one might expect that r¼ 0 can be HC’s equilibrium
strategy. This expectation turns out to be wrong.
To see the intuition behind this result, begin by considering LC’s best
response to HC’s strategy of r¼ 0. For extreme values of f (namely,
f   or f  ), we know by Remark 2 that LC would not report facts
other than the public signal. For other values of f, LC might engage in
helpful or deceptive factfinding, depending on ft. If f  0 and ft <
0 then LC would set f 0 < 0, helping both courts achieve their ideal dis-
position [Figure 2(b) and 2(c)]. Likewise, if f < 0 and ft  L then LC
would benefit both courts by setting f 0  0 [Figure 2(a)]. Deceptive fact-
finding is also possible: If f 2 ½0; Þ and ft 2 ½0;LÞ; then LC would guaran-
tee its preferred disposition, to the detriment of HC, by setting f 0 < 0
(Figure 1). (Recall that we are holding HC’s strategy fixed at r¼ 0.)
Following this logic, LC’s best response to HC’s strategy of r¼ 0 is set




Figure 2. Varieties of Helpful Factfinding.
When HC sets the rule at its ideal point (0), setting f 0 as shown helps both LC and HC
get their preferred dispositions.
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Lemma 1. LC’s best response to HC’s strategy of r¼ 0 is given by r‘ ¼
0 and the following choices of u and f 0.
1. If f < 0 then
u ¼ 0 if ft < L
u ¼ 1 and f 0 2 ½0; fþ  if ft  L

.
2. If f   then u ¼ 0.
3. If f 2 ½0; Þ then u ¼ 0 if ft  L
u ¼ 1 and f 0 2 ½f ; 0Þ if ft < L

.
To ascertain whether r¼ 0 can be HC’s equilibrium strategy, one must
ask whether r ¼ 0 is HC’s best response to LC’s best-response strategy
identified in Lemma 1. The answer is no, and the key to the answer is the
region f 2 ½0; Þ. By Lemma 1, in this region LC does not engage in fact-
finding when ft  L, and sets f 0 < 0 when ft < L. For HC to stick to
r¼ 0 in the face of f 0 < 0; HC must believe that the factfinding is prob-
ably helpful (i.e., the posterior probability that ft < 0 is high), or it must
be that changing the rule to counteract LC’s likely factfudging is too cost-
ly (i.e., f 0 is far to the left of HC’s ideal point of 0). Both of these condi-
tions can be satisfied when f is close to 0 (bottom portion of Figure 3). But
they cannot be satisfied when f is close to  (top portion of Figure 3)—be-
cause then the posterior probability that ft < 0 given f
0 < 0 is low, and
because f is so far to the right of 0 that LC cannot set f 0 sufficiently far to
the left of 0 to make a change of rule prohibitively expensive for HC.
(Note that the limited nature of LC’s ability to manipulate facts, which is
bounded by  to give analytical content to the legal concept of clear error,
is doing real work here.) This logic leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. There is no equilibrium in which HC’s strategy is r¼ 0.
This result holds regardless of how close the courts’ preferences are
(parameterized by L) or how much HC cares about case disposition (eh).
The lower the values of these parameters, the smaller the interval of public
signals that would trigger a profitable deviation from r¼ 0. But, there is
no positive value ofL or eh that eliminates profitable deviations
altogether.
Given that HC’s strategy of consistently setting the rule at its ideal
point cannot be supported in equilibrium, a natural follow-up question is
whether any consistent rulemaking strategy is supportable. The answer is
clearly no.
Corollary 1. There is no equilibrium in which HC’s strategy is r ¼ r̂ for
some r̂ 2 R.
Proof. By the proof of Remark 2, r ¼ 0 is HC’s unique optimal strategy
when f   or f  , and by Proposition 1, r¼ 0 cannot be HC’s equi-
librium strategy. h
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It is worth pausing to clarify what has and has not been shown. I have
shown that, contrary to plausible intuition, r¼ 0 cannot be sustained as
an equilibrium strategy. I have not shown whether and under what condi-
tions r¼ 0 can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. Even if HC does
not follow a strategy of always setting the rule at its ideal point, it is pos-
sible that in equilibrium the final rule will always end up there (i.e., r 6¼ 0
occurs off the equilibrium path). That is a possibility to explore when solv-
ing for equilibrium.
3.5 Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
This section discusses a pure-strategy equilibrium of the game (see
Proposition 2 in Appendix A for full characterization and proof). First
consider extreme values of f, meaning f   or f  . By Remark 2 and
Lemma 1, we know that, in these regions, LC does not engage in factfind-
ing and HC sets the rule at its ideal point. Next consider the critical region
f 2 ½0; Þ.
In this region, the discussion of rule distortion has shown that for f
close to , setting r¼ 0 cannot be a best response to f 0 < 0. How, then,
would HC respond to f 0 < 0? The key to answering this question is to
recognize that all rule choices but two are dominated. All choices of r > f 0
are dominated by r¼ 0 because they all lead to the same disposition and
r¼ 0 leads to a strictly higher rule utility. Likewise, all choices of r < f 0
are dominated by r ¼ f 0 because they all lead to the same disposition and
r ¼ f 0 provides the strictly highest rule utility. HC’s real choice is thus be-
tween r ¼ 0 and r ¼ f 0.
Two considerations determine the choice between these two rules: (1)
HC’s posterior belief that fis misrepresenting the truth (so choosing r¼ 0
would lead to the wrong disposition) and (2) the amount of rule utility
that HC would sacrifice by setting r ¼ f 0 to guard against the probable
loss of dispositional utility. For values of f close to 0 (the bottom portion
Figure 3. HC’s Calculus of Whether to Keep the Rule at its Ideal Point (r¼0) when
f 2 ð0; Þ and f 0 < 0.
When f is close to  (top of the figure), the probability that the factfinding is helpful is low
and countering it by changing the rule would be inexpensive; when f is close to 0 (bot-
tom), the probability of helpful factfinding is higher and changing the rule to counter it
could be expensive.
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of Figure 3), both considerations lead HC toward choosing 0 over f 0. For
values of f close to  (the top portion of Figure 3), in contrast, both consid-
erations pull HC toward choosing f 0. These dynamics lead to an equilib-
rium with a threshold structure. The threshold f in the interval ð0; Þ
specifies the value of f at which, provided LC sets f 0 as far to the left of 0
as possible (which is in its interest to do), HC’s expected utilities from r ¼
0 and r ¼ f 0 are equal. HC would “tolerate” LC’s factfinding below f but
not above f—meaning that if f > fand f 0 < 0 then HC would set r ¼ f 0
to counteract the factfinding.
LC’s factfinding is in turn based on HC’s anticipated response. When
f > f; LC does not set f 0 < 0 because such factfinding would trigger a re-
sponse of r ¼ f 0, which would both nullify the dispositional effect of LC’s
factfinding and set a rule far from LC’s ideal point. When f  f, in con-
trast, LC can get away with setting f 0 < 0 (provided it sets f 0 sufficiently
far to the left of 0, for example, f 0 ¼ f ). But setting f 0 < 0 would
make sense for LC only if the truth is to the left of its ideal point (ft < L),
because otherwise LC could get its preferred disposition under the public
signal and without bearing the cost of factfinding. So LC engages in fact-
finding and sets f 0 < 0 whenever f  f and ft < L, and does not en-
gage in factfinding otherwise.
Finally, consider the region f 2 ð; 0Þ. If ideal points are far apart
(L  ), then by Lemma 1.1 it is a best-response pair for LC not to engage
in factfinding and HC to set r¼ 0. (Given L  , the fact that f< 0 implies
that ft < L, so LC can obtain its preferred disposition without bearing
the cost of factfinding.) If ideal points are close (L < ), however, LC
might have an incentive to engage in factfinding because the public signal
might misrepresent the true location of case facts with respect to L. When
that is the case (i.e., when ft  L), LC would like to report f 0  0 to flip
the case’s disposition [recall Figure 2(a)]. Such factfinding would benefit
not only LC but also HC, because ft  L implies ft  0. So all factfinding
in the region ð; 0Þ is helpful, and HC always tolerates it.
To summarize, the structure of pure-strategy equilibrium is as follows:
When f   or f  , there is no factfinding and HC sets r ¼ 0. When
f 2 ð; 0Þ; HC sets r ¼ 0; LC does not engage in factfinding if ft < L
but engages in factfinding and sets f 0  0 if ft  L. When f 2 ½0; Þ; LC
does not have an incentive to engage in factfinding when ft  L but does
have an incentive to do so when ft < L. HC would tolerate factfinding
for f  f but would not tolerate it for f > f. Seeing this, LC does not en-
gage in factfinding when f > f but engages in factfinding and sets
f 0 < 0 when f  fand ft < L. The equilibrium factfinding outcome is
shown in Figure 4.10
10. The fact that perfect Bayesian equilibrium places no restrictions on off-path beliefs
often results in multiple equilibria in signaling games. However, given reasonable assump-
tions about HC’s beliefs, this equilibrium is the essentially unique pure-strategy equilibrium
of the game. Technical discussion of uniqueness is left for a separate appendix.
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Note well that, in equilibrium, the rule is always set at HC’s ideal point
even though HC’s rulemaking strategy anticipates setting another rule if
factfinding occurs beyond a certain threshold. The equilibrium outcome is
always r¼ 0 even though r¼ 0 is notHC’s rulemaking strategy.
3.6 Comparative Statics
First consider how the factfinding threshold f moves with different
parameters. The threshold increases with fact-intensiveness of the issue
(@f=@ > 0). When the case’s outcome depends heavily on facts that are
better observed by the trial court, and the trial court’s factfinding discre-
tion is concomitantly large, the region where the appellate court would
tolerate the trial court’s factfinding is wide.11
In contrast, the factfinding region contracts as HC attaches more im-
portance to case disposition (@f=@eh < 0). When HC cares more about
the case, it becomes more willing to forego rule utility to guard against the
possibility of being duped into the wrong disposition. So HC becomes
more willing to punish factfinding, which leads LC to do less of it.
The impact of the courts’ preference divergence on the factfinding
threshold is more nuanced. When the courts’ preferences are not terribly
distant, preference divergence reduces the factfinding threshold
(@f=@L < 0). Once preference divergence passes a certain point, how-
ever, further divergence ceases to affect the factfinding threshold, which
stabilizes at a certain value (@f=@L ¼ 0).12 Figure 5 shows how the
Figure 4. Factfinding in the Pure-Strategy Equilibrium.
11. Thinking back to HC’s choice between r ¼ 0 and r ¼ f 0, a larger  makes r ¼ 0
more attractive both because it increases the probability that ft < 0 and because it allows
LC to increase the amount of rule utility that HC would have to forego to counteract LC’s
factfinding.
12. The closed-form expression for the factfinding threshold is:
f ¼
2þ Lþ eh 
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
L2 þ e2h þ 6Leh
q
2
if L < fm þ 







The intuition behind the piecewise structure of f is as follows (see the proof of
Proposition 2 for a more precise treatment). Begin with really far off values of L (i.e.,
L  2), where LC would like to set f 0 < 0when ever f 2 ½0; Þ (because
f 2 ½0; Þ ) ft < L). For such a large preference gap, given LC’s factfinding incentives, if
HC observes factfinding at f 0 < 0 then its posterior belief about the truth is no different
from its prior, which is to say ft  U½f ; fþ . Because the posterior does not depend on
L, further increases in preference divergence have no effect on the probability that LC’s
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factfinding threshold changes with preference divergence, reflecting this
piecewise structure.
Now consider how probabilities of deceptive and helpful factfinding
change with the model’s parameters (see Appendix A for derivations).
The effects of LC’s dispositional utility (e‘) and factfinding cost (c) are
straightforward. Factfinding can occur only if LC cares enough about the
case that changing the disposition would be worth the cost of factfinding
(i.e., if e‘ > c), so the probability of factfinding decreases in its cost and
increases in LC’s dispositional utility.
Both deceptive and helpful factfinding decrease in HC’s dispositional
utility (eh). As HC attaches more importance to a case, it becomes more
willing to sacrifice rule utility to guard against the possibility of getting the
wrong disposition. So, the threshold (f) beyond which HC would not
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Factfinding Threshold as Function of Preference Divergence.
(a) The function for fixed levels of fact-intensiveness() and case importance (eh). (b) The
same function for three different sets of values for fact-intensiveness and case import-
ance: The blue (solid) line fixes a pair of ð; ehÞ as a baseline. The red (broken) line has
the same eh value but a higher , showing that the factfinding threshold is greater every-
where when the issue is more fact-intensive. The black (dotted) line fixes the same  value
as the baseline case but with a higher eh, showing that HC tolerates less factfinding
when it cares more about the case.
:
factfinding is deceptive, and a factfinding threshold that is independent of L can be calcu-
lated. This threshold, denoted above by fm, demarcates the minimal region of factfinding
that HC would tolerate. For lower values of L, HC’s posterior belief about the truth condi-
tional on f 0 < 0 is given by ft  U½f ;minfL; fþ g. Here, factfinding might be tolerated
above the minimal threshold, and the factfinding threshold might depend on
LbecauseHC’s belief about ft depends on L. Not so for values of L above f

m þ , however,
because if HC’s expected payoffs from setting r ¼ 0 and r ¼ f 0 are equal when ft 
U½fm  ; fm þ  then the expected payoff from setting r ¼ 0 is lower than from r ¼
f 0 when ft  U½f ;L for all L > fm þ ; f > fm. The upshot is that the threshold f is a
function of L for L < fm þ  but is constant with respect to L for L > fm þ . At
L ¼ fm þ , the function equals the constant.
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tolerate factfinding moves leftward, and the factfinding region shrinks
[Figure 5(b)].
Factfinding increases in fact-intensiveness (). Both deceptive and help-
ful factfinding increase when the case is heavily fact-dependent and LC
has greater factfinding discretion.
The impact of the two courts’ preference divergence (L) is nuanced and
counterintuitive. At first blush, one would expect preference divergence to
increase factfinding because it expands the conflict region where the two
courts’ ideal dispositions differ. But in fact the effect of preference diver-
gence depends both on the variety of factfinding (helpful or deceptive)
and on how far apart ideal points already are, as shown in Figure 6. When
ideal points are close or moderately far apart (L < L2 in Figure 6), an in-
crease in L decreases helpful factfinding but increases deceptive factfind-
ing. Once preference divergence passes a threshold (L 2 ðL2;L3Þ), further
increases in L decrease both helpful and deceptive factfinding. But this ef-
fect persists only up to a point; once L passes another threshold (L > L3),
further increases in preference divergence cease to have any effect on any
kind of factfinding. This second threshold, of course, is the same one be-
yond which f ceases to depend on L (i.e., L3 ¼ fm þ ).
The source of nonmonotonicity is that preference divergence has two
opposing effects on deceptive factfinding. Preference divergence creates
additional incentives for deceptive factfinding by expanding the conflict
region; but HC knows this, so it becomes less tolerant of factfinding as
preferences diverge, which in turn makes LC less inclined to engage in
factfinding for fear of being punished by a bad rule. When preferences are
close or moderately far apart, the added factfinding incentives created by
a marginal increase in preference divergence outweigh the chilling effects
of anticipating a harsh response, so preference divergence increases decep-
tive factfinding. But when preferences are farther apart, the deterrent ef-
fect dominates and further preference divergence reduces deceptive
factfinding.
3.7 Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
One feature of the pure-strategy equilibrium is that there is no reversal of
the LC. But reversals do occur in reality, albeit at a low rate.13 The mixed-
strategy equilibrium presented in this section shows that the same qualita-
tive results can be obtained with reversals in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 in Appendix A presents a mixed-strategy equilibrium for
when the two courts’ ideal points are very far apart (L  2), analogous to
the pure-strategy equilibrium with distant preferences.14 As before, the
13. In the year ending December 31, 2016, reversals constituted 8.5% of decisions in
cases terminated on the merits in the US Courts of Appeals. See the Statistical Tables sec-
tion of the US Courts website (Table B-5).
14. That is, Case 1 in the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A. Mixed-strategy ana-
logues to the pure-strategy equilibrium when L 2 ½; 2Þ or L <  can similarly be
characterized.
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players’ strategies for f   or f < 0 are straightforward—HC always
sets the rule at its ideal point and LC never engages in factfinding. In the
middle region (f 2 ½0; Þ), there is a threshold (f) below which LC always
engages in factfinding and HC tolerates it.
What’s different in the mixed-strategy equilibrium is what happens
when f 2 ðf; Þ. Here, a strategy of always engaging in factfinding by LC
is not sustainable in equilibrium because HC would counter LC’s factfind-
ing by moving the rule to the left. Seeing this, LC did not engage in fact-
finding at all in the pure-strategy equilibrium. In the mixed-strategy
equilibrium, in contrast, LC sometimes engages in factfinding and HC
sometimes tolerates it. The key to sustaining such a strategy profile in
equilibrium is that LC’s propensity to engage in factfinding depends on
the true facts: LC’s probability of factfinding is higher when the true facts
fall below HC’s ideal point (helpful factfinding) than when they fall above
Figure 6. Probabilities of Helpful and Deceptive Factfinding as a Function of Preference
Divergence (Parameter Values: eh ¼ 2;  ¼ 2).
Helpful factfinding is decreasing in preference divergence until it stabilizes for L > L3; in
contrast, deceptive factfinding initially increases for L < L2, then decreases for
L 2 ðL2; L3Þ, and finally stabilizes for L > L3. Both probabilities are continuous every-
where in L but take three different functional forms for L < L1; L 2 ðL1;L3Þ, and L > L3.
Note that L1 ¼  and L3 ¼ f m þ .
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HC’s ideal point (deceptive factfinding).15 Otherwise, by the same logic as
before, HC would never tolerate the factfinding. As it is, HC sometimes
tolerates the factfinding (r¼ 0) and sometimes not (r ¼ f 0), and the latter
is what produces reversals. A comparison of factfinding in the pure- and
mixed-strategy equilibria appears in Figure 7.
4. Discussion
The first result to highlight is that there is no truthful equilibrium
(Remark 1). This result is analytically simple but substantively important.
Consider an example that resonates with contemporary concerns sur-
rounding police accountability. During the 1960s, the Warren Court
greatly expanded the rights of criminal defendants. One landmark of this
“criminal procedure revolution” was Mapp v. Ohio, 367U.S. 643 (1961),
which held that evidence obtained by searches and seizures conducted in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is not admissible in state criminal
prosecutions. Shortly after Mapp was decided, a curious change occurred
in reported fact patterns in states where such evidence had previously
been admissible. As Irving Younger, a former prosecutor and judge, has
described, police officers stopped testifying that they had recovered
incriminating evidence after searching the defendant “for little or no rea-
son,” and started testifying instead that the defendant panicked upon see-
ing the police and dropped the evidence on the ground [Younger (1968)].
This sudden proliferation of sloppy defendants is so well-known that it
was given its own name—“dropsy” testimony [Barlow (1968), Note
(1968)]. It is part of a larger pattern of suspicious police testimony,
dubbed “testilying,” which has caused concern for many scholars,
Figure 7. Factfinding in Pure- and Mixed-Strategy Equilibria when L  2.
15. What is pinned down is the relationship between the probabilities of helpful and de-






p1, which satisfies p1 > p2 when f 2 ðf; Þ.
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lawyers, and journalists [e.g., Orfield (1992); Cloud (1994); Mollen (1994);
Slobogin (1996)].16
However, these concerned accounts make no reference to deferential
fact review, and they portray trial judges simply as being tricked by police
perjury. This characterization is probably accurate in many cases—trial
judges often cannot detect perjury in a given case even if they suspect a
broader pattern of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the model gives us reason
to think of fact deference as part of the institutional structure that contrib-
utes to phenomena like testilying. It encourages us to think of trial judges
not simply as duped by police perjury (which they may be in many cases)
but also potentially as active participants in fact distortion. The result
that there is no truthful equilibrium may be interpreted as suggesting that
trial judges sometimes credit dubious police testimony even if they can de-
tect it as untruthful.17 For example, in “dropsy” cases, it is plausible to
think that some trial judges hostile to the Warren Court’s (rather radical)
doctrinal innovations used their factfinding discretion to render the new
rules ineffective by crediting questionable police testimony.18
The next important result is that there is no equilibrium with a consist-
ent rulemaking strategy (Proposition 1 and Corollary 1). This is important
because a consistent strategy seems to respect rule-of-law ideals. The idea
that the same law should apply to everyone is deeply embedded in under-
standings of justice and equality before the law. The fact that appellate
courts will not commit to any law appears to deviate from this ideal.
However, interpretation of this result is complicated by the fact that, in
the pure-strategy equilibrium, the rule is always set at the HC’s ideal
point. That is not because the HC commits to its ideal rule, but rather be-
cause it threatens deviation from its ideal rule if it observes certain kinds
of factfinding given certain public signals, which deters the LC from those
kinds of factfinding, so there is no need to carry out the threat of rule dis-
tortion. The upshot is that the rulemaking outcome is consistent, though
the strategy is not.
It is not obvious what normative conclusion to draw from this result.
What is clear is that the distinction between equilibrium strategy and
16. See also Joseph Goldstein, “Officers Said They Smelled Pot. The Judge Called Them
Liars,” N.Y. Times, Sep. 12, 2019; Joseph Goldstein, “‘Testilying’ by Police: A Stubborn
Problem,” N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2018; David Kocieniewski, “New York Pays a High Price
for Police Lies,” N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1997; Anthony Flint, “Bratton Calls ‘Testilying’ by
Police a Real Concern,” Boston Globe, Nov. 15, 1995.
17. This result in no way depends on ascribing sinister or ideological motives to trial
judges. The courts’ disagreement over rules (H 6¼ L), which gives rise to disagreement over
outcomes (dL 6¼ dH), may be entirely the product of genuine legal considerations.
18. Of course, the extent of the problem is an empirical question. Whether trial judges
fudged facts cannot be directly empirically verified (which is one reason doing theoretical
work is useful), but the theory has empirically falsifiable predictions that, if verified, would
increase one’s confidence in using the theoretical framework to empirically estimate other
components (such as the extent of factfudging) that are not capable of atheoretical empirical
verification. See the Conclusion for more thoughts on empirical followups.
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outcome would not be empirically observable or conceptually clear with-
out a formal model. Because rule distortion occurs off the equilibrium
path, an observer not engaged with the theory would be misled into think-
ing that the courts are committed to consistently applying the same rule.
The empirical fact of rule consistency paints a picture of legal consistency
that masks a more complicated strategic reality.
The mixed-strategy equilibrium preserves the salient qualitative fea-
tures and comparative statics of the pure-strategy equilibrium while
allowing for reversals. With mixed strategies, rule distortion occurs not
just off the equilibrium path but on path as well, producing reversals of
the LC. Unlike most judicial-politics models, reversals in this model are
not due to the LC’s thinking that its decision might not get reviewed
(recall that appeal is as of right). Nor is reversal attributable to the trial
court’s uncertainty about what rule the appellate court wants (e.g.,
because the legal issue is difficult). Rather, reversal occurs because of
the structure of fact discretion: Given the appellate court’s posterior
probability that the trial court’s factfinding is deceptive, and given the
rule utility it would have to forego to counter potentially deceptive fact-
finding, the appellate court is indifferent and mixes between tolerating
and not tolerating the trial court’s factfinding. The choice to not tolerate
produces reversals.19
When rule distortion occurs (r 6¼ 0), the equilibrium rule is Pareto-
dominated for the two courts—there are rules that both courts would pre-
fer to the equilibrium rule. (When reversal occurs, r ¼ f 0 < 0, so there are
rules (e.g., r¼ 0) that both courts would prefer.) Pareto-dominance occurs
because, to deter deceptive factfinding, HC must set the rule to the left of
its ideal point. Substantively, these results show why we might observe
reversals and seemingly suboptimal rulemaking even when the legal issue
is not difficult and appellate review is virtually certain.
The most interesting of the comparative statics is on preference diver-
gence. One’s intuition might be that preference divergence should in-
crease factfinding because it expands the region where the two courts’
ideal dispositions conflict. But the effect is actually nonmonotonic and
nuanced. The nuance is traceable to two sources. First, the trial court’s
factfinding can help as well as hurt the appellate court, and preference
divergence has different effects on these different kinds of factfinding.
Second, though preference divergence enlarges the conflict region and
hence the trial court’s incentives for deceptive factfinding, it also height-
ens the appellate court’s suspicion that any factfinding it observes is de-
ceptive rather than helpful, which makes it more willing to punish
factfinding, which in turn deters the trial court. The incentive and
19. The claim here is not that fact discretion is the main reason for reversals. Trial
courts’ uncertainty about the applicable rule (a mistaken assessment of H) probably
explains a greater share of reversals. But the point is that—even in the absence of this more
obvious explanation—reversals could still occur because of deferential fact review.
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deterrence effects pull in opposite directions, producing a nonmonotic
effect on deceptive factfinding.
5. Fact Deference as Equilibrium Institution
The main purpose of this work is to understand the consequences of fact
deference—that is, to take the institution as given and explore its strategic
implications. But one might also ask why fact deference persists as an
equilibrium institution. A full answer to that question demands a separate
inquiry, but my analysis sheds some light on the issue.
One evident explanation, in light of common principal-agent intu-
itions, is that appellate courts grant discretion to trial courts to benefit
from their increased effort in factfinding [e.g., Aghion and Tirole
(1997)]. To assess the validity of this explanation, one must determine
whether trial and appellate courts are better off under the American
system or one in which there is no factfinding discretion. So I compare
the trial and appellate courts’ equilibrium utilities in the game solved
above to utilities in a modified setup in which the trial court must report
the same facts as the public signal (i.e., f 0 ¼ f). In the modified setup,
the public signal can still misrepresent the truth (i.e., f 6¼ ft), but the trial
court cannot report facts other than f—there is no opportunity for ei-
ther deceptive or helpful factfinding. The results of the comparison ap-
pear in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4
1. LC is better off with factfinding discretion than without.
2. HC is better off with factfinding discretion than without iff the two
courts’ ideal points are close. Formally, 9 ~L 2 ð0; Þ such that HC
is better off with factfinding discretion than without iff L < ~L.
The trial court is better off with fact discretion than without, regardless
of the level of preference divergence between the two courts. The reason is
straightforward: The American system provides an additional factfinding
tool to the trial court, which it uses when helpful and declines to use when
unhelpful, so it always benefits from the institution. (A trial court could use
this added ability in ways that would backfire and hurt it—by engaging in
factfinding that is countered by the appellate court’s imposition of a punish-
ing rule—but such counterproductive use does not occur in equilibrium.)
In contrast, the appellate court is better off with fact deference than
without if and only if the two courts’ ideal points are close to each other.
The logic goes back to the two different kinds of factfinding. Recall that
factfinding tends to be helpful when ideal points are close together
(Figure 2) and deceptive when they are far apart (Figure 1). So, the appel-
late court prefers the American regime of factfinding discretion only in the
former case. Otherwise, the appellate court is better off going by its own
signal of case facts, noisy as it is, than having to defer to the trial court’s
factfinding. This result has an affinity with the “ally principle” that the
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principal delegates greater discretion to agents with similar preferences
[e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987); Epstein and O’Halloran (1994); but
see Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) and Huber and McCarty (2004) for
qualifications].
Proposition 4.2 undermines the delegation-for-effort explanation. If
fact deference is beneficial to appellate courts only when trial courts have
similar preferences, an explanation grounded in appellate courts’ self-
interested delegation implies that we should observe more deference when
trial and appellate courts tend to agree on the law. But factfinding defer-
ence is a pervasive feature of the American judicial system, and there are
no variations that correspond in any apparent way to preference diver-
gence in the judicial hierarchy. It is unclear why the principal would agree
to bind itself categorically to an institution of deference whose benefits are
so contingent. The discretion-for-effort explanation seems unpersuasive
because the principal is often better off without the agent’s effort.
The failure of this explanation suggests that the search for the institu-
tion’s raison d’être should not stop with intermediate appellate courts. We
might do better if, instead of looking to the immediate principal, we look
to the principal’s principal (e.g., the state or federal Supreme Court) or to
a different player in charge of setting the rules of the principal-agent game
(e.g., the legislature).
Such an approach would be consistent with evidence of appellate
courts’ occasional efforts to break free from the shackles of fact deference.
A recent example concerns patents. In patent law, “claim construction”
refers to the court’s interpretation of a patent “claim,” which is the part of
a patent application that “defines the scope of the patentee’s rights”
[Markman v. Westview Intruments, Inc., 517U.S. 370, 372 (1996)]. Claim
construction is important in patent litigation because whether the claim is
construed narrowly or broadly often determines whether the defendant
has infringed the patentee’s rights, and because an indefinite claim renders
the patent invalid [Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2120 (2014)]. Claim construction is, like the construction of contracts and
other legal instruments, a question of law (Markman, 517U.S. at 372).
But the legal question of claim construction sometimes involves subsidiary
factual questions about the underlying science or technology [Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015)]. The
Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, held
in a series of cases that de novo review applies not only to the ultimate
claim construction but also to factual findings made along the way (see
Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North Am. Corp.,
744F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc)). The Supreme Court recently
reversed this line of cases, holding that a trial judge’s resolution of an
underlying factual dispute as part of claim construction must be reviewed
under the clear-error standard (Teva Pharmaceuticals, 135 S. Ct. at 835).
This example shows the importance of standards of review to innov-
ation policy. It also shows the need to look beyond intermediate appellate
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courts in trying to understand why deferential fact review survives. The
Federal Circuit sought to increase its hold over patent doctrine by apply-
ing a de novo standard. It was only the Supreme Court’s intervention that
stemmed this rebellion and ensured the continued vitality of the clear-
error standard. Deferential fact review persists not because of the immedi-
ate principal’s support but in spite of its opposition.
Finally, the discussion raises the possibility of alternative institutional
designs for fact review. One extreme option is de novo fact review as of
right on appeal. If de novo fact review is accompanied by de novo fact in-
vestigation, then it would eliminate strategic fact distortion but at im-
mense cost to the judicial system. If de novo fact review is not
accompanied by factual investigation on appeal, then the setting is the fa-
miliar one of cheap talk [see Krishna and Morgan (2016) for a review]. As
a practical matter, it seems improbable that appellate courts would be
given greater factfinding authority without a correspondingly improved
factfinding apparatus, given that, as noted in Section 1, the present system
gives trial courts a better vantage point for observing facts. But one lesson
of the present analysis is that although appellate courts cannot see case
facts as clearly as trial courts, they may still learn a good deal about the
probable accuracy of trial courts’ factfinding by considering their strategic
incentives. Another possibility is to couple de novo fact review with defer-
ential review of legal determinations. There is precedent for deferential re-
view of lawmaking in the context of Chevron deference to agencies’
statutory interpretation, but the rationale for expanding such deference to
trial courts’ legal determinations is difficult to see. An intermediate possi-
bility is an “auditing” design where the appellate court is granted discre-
tion to review the facts for a limited number of cases de novo. It can be
shown that more-informative equilibria are possible in this context, much
in the spirit of the auditing models cited in Section 2. Another possibility
is to utilize different trial courts with different preferences, perhaps sitting
on a panel. Understanding the properties of such a system can be aided by
cheap talk literature on multiple senders [e.g., Krishna and Morgan
(2001); Battaglini (2002)], but incorporating deference would require ma-
chinery similar to the one developed here and distinct from cheap talk.
Rigorous investigation of alternative institutional designs seems to be a
promising path for future work.
6. Conclusion
I have presented a formal model of deferential fact review in a judicial
hierarchy. The analysis shows that trial courts will not always report case
facts truthfully. This result focuses attention on trial courts themselves,
not just the parties, as a potential source of fact distortion. As the dropsy
example shows, the problem might be of particular concern in criminal
justice and policing, areas which have recently attracted much public and
scholarly attention [e.g., Coviello and Persico (2015); Goel et al. (2016);
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Daughety and Reinganum (2018)]. The analysis also shows that appellate
courts will not commit to consistent rules. This is a point about the strat-
egy of rulemaking—not its outcome, which always ends up at the appel-
late court’s ideal point in the pure-strategy equilibrium. The distinction
between the strategy and outcome of rulemaking lays bare strategic dy-
namics that would not be empirically observable or conceptually clear
without a formal model. The mixed-strategy equilibrium shows how fact
discretion can lead to suboptimal (Pareto-dominated) rules, as well as
why trial courts may get reversed even when the legal issue is not difficult
and appellate review is not discretionary. The most interesting of the com-
parative statics is that preference divergence has a nonmonotonic effect
on factfinding, depending on the kind of factfinding and on the existing
level of preference divergence. A comparison of the American judicial sys-
tem to one without fact deference shows that fact deference is beneficial to
appellate courts if and only if their preferences are closely aligned with
trial courts. This suggests looking beyond the canonical account of dele-
gation to induce effort in order to understand why deferential review
survives.
These results can be extended in different directions. In this article, the
trial court’s factfinding discretion manifests itself in the choice of facts to
report, not in discovering facts; the trial court is assumed to have already
learned the facts. This modeling choice is appropriate in capturing the
American system of litigation, which is adversarial rather than inquisitor-
ial. Moreover, learning would occur even absent any strategic principal-
agent considerations, and I wanted to focus on strategic factfinding. But
the learning and strategic aspects may interact in interesting ways—say, in
a model where the trial court also gets a noisy fact signal (though less
noisy than the public signal) and can engage in costly factfinding both to
reduce its noise and to buy credibility to report facts beyond the public
signal.
Future work can also incorporate legal complexity by assuming that
the trial court knows the neighborhood of the appellate court’s ideal point
but not its exact location. In this modified setting, reversal-averse trial
courts would want to use their factfinding discretion to avoid reporting
facts in the zone of uncertainty—a form of strategic factfinding distinct
from the disposition-motivated variety discussed above, and one which
does not require ideal-point divergence. Additional complexities would
arise from two-sided uncertainty. Finally, one could consider alternative
institutional designs such as factfinding by a panel of trial judges.
The model’s comparative statics can be pursued in future empirical
work. Two distinct empirical strategies, among others, are worth mention-
ing. First, in the context of motions to suppress (see Section 4), a trial court
may decide the motion on the papers or it may hold a hearing. A suppres-
sion hearing imposes additional workload costs, but it widens the range of
facts the trial court could permissibly find by giving it an opportunity to
hear witnesses and rest its decision on witness credibility. The decision
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whether to conduct a suppression hearing is thus a good real-world ex-
ample of costly factfinding as conceptualized in the model, and the com-
parative statics on factfinding can be tested with the rate of suppression
hearings as the dependent variable. Second, one could use text analysis and
machine learning to parse out factual from legal discussion in judicial opin-
ions, then use the extent of factual discussion as the dependent variable.
Appendix A
Proof of Remark 1. Suppose for contradiction that signff 0g ¼
signfftg 8f. Then HC would set r¼ 0, so LC would also set r‘ ¼ 0. (That
r¼ 0 follows from the fact that 0 is the unique maximizer of the rule
component of HC’s utility function, and if signff 0g ¼ signfftg then 0
also maximizes the disposition component. To see that r‘ ¼ 0, note
from equation (1) that ULCðr‘ ¼ 0Þ ¼ Lþ a cuþ e1 ðd ¼ dLÞ >
L cuþ e1ðd ¼ dLÞ ¼ ULCðr‘ 6¼ 0Þ.) Consider the region where
ft 2 ½0;LÞ and f 2 ½0; Þ. There, maxfULCðf 0  0Þg ¼ Lþ a < Lþ
a cþ e ¼ ULCðf 0 < 0Þ. h
Proof of Remark 2. First claim: f  ) Prðft  0Þ ¼ 1, so r¼ 0 unique-
ly maximizes HC’s expected utility. Therefore, r ¼ r‘ ¼ 0 in equilibrium.
Fix r‘ ¼ 0 and consider LC’s choice of u. We know that
ULCðu ¼ 0Þ ¼ Lþ aþ e1ðd ¼ dLÞ. Given r¼ 0, the last term of LC’s
payoff is not affected by the choice of u, so
ULCðu ¼ 1Þ ¼ Lþ a cþ e1ðd ¼ dLÞ < ULCðu ¼ 0Þ. Second claim:
f  ) Prðft < 0Þ ¼ 1, which implies similarly that u ¼ 0. h
Proof of Lemma 1. That r‘ ¼ 0 is a best response was proven for
Remark 1. The proof for LC’s choices of u and f 0 is as follows:
1. if ft < L thenLC can obtain its preferred dispostion without fact-
finding. If ft  L then ULCðf 0 2 ½0; fþ Þ ¼ Lþ a cþ e >
Lþ a ¼ maxfULC ðf 0 62 ½0; fþ Þg. (For the right-hand side of the
inequality, note that ULCðu ¼ 0Þ ¼ Lþ a and ULCðu ¼ 1; f 0
< 0Þ ¼ Lþ a c.);
2. by Remark 2; and
3. if ft  L then LC can obtain its preferred dispostion without fact-
finding. If ft < L then ULCðf 0 2 ½f ; 0ÞÞ ¼ Lþ a cþ e > 
Lþ a ¼ maxfULCðf 0 62 ½f ; 0ÞÞg. (For the right-hand side of the
inequality, note that ULCðu ¼ 0Þ ¼ Lþ a and ULCðu ¼ 1; f 0  0Þ
¼ Lþ a c.) h
Proof of Proposition 1. The strategy of this proof is to check whether
r ¼ 0 remains HC’s best reponse to LC’s best-response strategy set forth
in Lemma 1. Suppose f 2 ½0; Þ and HC observes f 0 < 0. Then by
Lemma 1, HC updates the distribution of true facts to
ft  U½f ;minfL; fþ g. (This posterior belief assumes that when
ft < L;LC’s choice of f
0 from ff 0jf 0 < 0g does not depend on signfftg.
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Finding a profitable deviation from r ¼ 0 when f 0 is independent of ft is
of course sufficient to show that a profitable deviation also exists when f 0
does depend on ft.) If HC sticks to the strategy r ¼ 0;
then d ¼ 1 and HC’s expected utility is given by EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼
ePrðdH ¼ 1Þ ¼ ePrðft < 0Þ ¼ eð fÞ=ðminfL; fþ g  fþ Þ. Now
consider a deviation to r ¼ f 0. For the deviation to be profitable, we
must have EUHCðr ¼ f 0Þ > EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ, which is to say
f >eð fminfL; fþ gÞ=ðminfL; fþ g  fþ Þ. It is sufficient to
check the inequality at minf 0 ¼ f . And it is easy to see that the inequal-
ity is satisfied for values of f sufficiently close to , because
limf" LHS ¼ 0 > e ¼ limf"RHS. We conclude that there exist f 2 ½0; Þ
for which HC has a profitable deviation from r¼ 0, which shows that the
strategy r¼ 0 cannot be sustained in equilibrium.h
Proposition 2. The following profile of strategies and beliefs character-
izes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
1. If f   or f   then HC sets r ¼ 0 andLC sets r‘ ¼ 0; u ¼ 0.
HC’s beliefs are that Prðft < 0jf  Þ ¼ 0 and Prðft <
0jf  Þ ¼ 1.
2. If f 2 ð; 0Þ then
. HC sets r ¼ 0.
. LC sets r‘ ¼ 0 and
u ¼ 0 if ft < L
u ¼ 1; f 0  0 if ft  L

.
. HC’s beliefs on path are given by Bayes’ rule. Off path,
Prðft < 0ju ¼ 1; f 0 < 0Þ ¼ 1 and Prðft < 0jf 0  0Þ ¼ 0.
3. If f 2 ½0; Þ then
. HC sets r ¼ 0 if EUHC r ¼ 0ð Þ  EUHC r ¼ f
0ð Þ
f 0 if EUHC r ¼ 0ð Þ < EUHC r ¼ f 0ð Þ

.
In particular, if LC sets f 0  0 then HC sets r ¼ 0 and
if LC sets f ¼f  then HC sets r ¼ 0 for f  f

f  for f > f

where f ¼
fm for L  fm þ 
2þ Lþ eh 
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
L2 þ e2h þ 6Leh
q
2
for L < fm þ 
8><
>:
and fm ¼ 
2
ehþ.
. LC sets r‘ ¼ 0 and
u ¼ 1; f 0 ¼ f  if f  f and ft < L
u ¼ 0 otherwise

.
. HC’s beliefs on path are given by Bayes’ rule. Off path,
Prðft < 0jf 0 ¼ xÞ ¼ f
0 if x  0
 f
minfL; fþ g  fþ  if x < 0
(that is, if f 0 < 0 then HC believes that ft  U½f ;minfL; fþ gÞ.
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Proof. For f   or f  , that the strategy-belief profile is an equilib-
rium follows immediately from Remark 2. For other values of f, it is con-
venient to consider three cases separately: (1) L  2 (the two courts’ ideal
points are very far apart); (2) L 2 ½; 2Þ (ideal points are moderately far
apart); and (3) L <  (ideal points are close).
Case 1: L  2. In this case, parts 2 and 3 of the Proposition become:
2. If f 2 ð; 0Þ then HC sets r ¼ 0 and LC sets r‘ ¼ 0;u ¼ 0.
3. If f 2 ½0; Þ then HC’s strategy is as described in the Proposition
and
LC sets r‘ ¼ 0 and
u ¼ 1; f 0 ¼ f  if f  fm
u ¼ 0 otherwise

.
First consider f 2 ð; 0Þ. That LC’s strategy is a best response was pro-
ven in Lemma 1. As for HC: On the equilibrium path, note that r> f is
strictly dominated by r ¼ 0 and r < f is strictly dominated by r¼ f.
Because LC is always setting u ¼ 0; HC’s posterior is the same as its
prior: ft  ½f ; fþ . So EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ eð fÞ=2 > fþ eðþ fÞ=
2 ¼ EUHCðr ¼ fÞ, so r¼ 0 is a best response. Off the equilibrium path, if
u ¼ 1 and f 0 < 0 then, given off-path beliefs, EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ e ¼
maxUHC. And if f
0  0 then, given off-path beliefs, EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼
e ¼ maxUHC.
Next, consider f 2 ½0; Þ. First we verify that HC’s strategy is a best re-
sponse if LC sets f 0 < 0. Note that r > f 0 is strictly dominated by r¼ 0,
and r < f 0 is strictly dominated by r ¼ f 0, so the best rule choice is either
f 0 or 0. Now consider in particular the case f 0 ¼ f . Let gðfÞ 	
EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ  EUHCðr ¼ f Þ ¼ 2  fðeþ Þ= and solve for
f when gðfÞ ¼ 0, which yields f ¼ 2=ðeþ Þ 	 fm. Note that @g=@f < 0,
so HC’s best response is to choose r ¼ 0 when f < fm and r ¼
f  when f > fm.
Next, we verify that HC’s strategy is a best response if LC
does not engage in factfinding. If u ¼ 0 and f > fm, then by Bayes’
rule there is no updating of ft  U½f ; fþ , so
Prðft  0Þ ¼ ðþ fÞ=2  ð fÞ=2 ¼ Prðft < 0Þ. Therefore, EUHCðr ¼
0Þ ¼ e Prðft  0Þ > rþ e Prðft < 0Þ ¼ EUHCðr > fÞ. We also have
that e Prðft  0Þ  jrj þ e Prðft  0Þ ¼ EUHCðr  fÞ. If u ¼
0 and f  fm then (given off-path beliefs) we have
EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ e ¼ maxUHC. Finally, we verify that HC’s strategy is a
best response if u ¼ 1 and f 0  0. In that case, off-path beliefs dictate
that Prðft < 0Þ ¼ 0, so EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ e ¼ maxUHC.
As for LC, note first that L  2 implies ft < L. If f  fm then LC’s
strategy of f 0 ¼ f  yields ULC ¼ Lþ e cþ a. As for deviations,
ULCðr‘ ¼ 0;u ¼ 0Þ ¼ Lþ a; ULCðr‘ 6¼ 0;u ¼ 0Þ ¼ L; ULCðr‘ ¼
0;u ¼ 1; f 0  0Þ ¼ L cþ a; ULCðr‘ 6¼ 0;u ¼ 1; f 0  0Þ ¼ L c;
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maxULCðr‘ ¼ 0; f 0 < 0Þ ¼ Lþ e cþ a;
ULCðr‘ ¼ f 0; f 0 < 0Þ ¼
Lþ e c if r ¼ 0
f 0  L cþ a if r ¼ f 0

;
and maxULCðr‘ 62 f0; f 0g; f 0 < 0Þ ¼ Lþ e c.
We see that there are no profitable deviations and LC’s strategy is a
best response when f  fm.
If f > fm then LC’s strategy of r‘ ¼ 0;u ¼ 0 yields ULC ¼ Lþ a. As
for deviations, maxULCðf 0 < 0Þ ¼ f 0  L cþ a; maxULCðu ¼ 1; f 0 
0Þ ¼ L cþ a; and ULCðr‘ 6¼ 0;u ¼ 0Þ ¼ L. So there are no profit-
able deviations and LC’s strategy is a best response when f > fm. This
completes the proof for Case 1.
Case 2: L 2 ½; 2Þ. The proof for when f 2 ð; 0Þ is the same as in the
last case, so focus on f 2 ½0; Þ. First we show that HC’s strategy is a best
response when f 0 < 0. It is clear, as before, that all rule choices except for
r ¼ 0 and r ¼ f 0 are strictly dominated, so the general form of HC’s strat-
egy is correct. More particularly, we must show that HC’s strategy is a
best response when f 0 ¼ f . The strategy of the proof is, first, to estab-
lish that the threshold value fm calculated above remains the minimal
threshold below which factfinding will be tolerated, and then to investi-
gate whether and under what conditions factfinding would also be toler-
ated for f above fm. First we show that if f  fm and f 0 ¼ f  then r ¼ 0
is a best response. We know that r¼ 0 is a best response whenever
EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ  EUHCðr ¼ f Þ, which is to say ePrðft < 0Þ  f þ




 f  when L  2
(A1)
eð fÞ
minfL; fþ g  fþ   f þ
eminfL; fþ g
minfL; fþ g  fþ  when L < 2
(A2)
We know from Case 1 that condition (A1) is satisfied for all f  fm, so
to show that condition (A2) is also satisfied, it is sufficient to show that
ðA1Þ ) ðA2Þ. If L  fþ  then conditions (A1) and (A2) are the same
and we are done. If L < fþ  then condition (A2) can be rewritten as
eð f LÞ
L fþ   f  (A3)
To show that ðA1Þ ) ðA3Þ it is sufficient to show that
ef=  eð f LÞ=ðL fþ 

, which after algebra reduces to
þ f L  0, which is satisfied by hypothesis. (Moreover, note that when
L < fþ , if (A1) holds weakly then (A3) holds strictly.) Recalling from
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Case 1 that Condition (A1) is equivalent to f  fm, we conclude that
whenever f  fm, a best response of HC to f 0 ¼ f  is r ¼ 0.
Next, we consider whether HC would also set r¼ 0 in response to
f 0 ¼ f  when f > fm. First consider the case L < fm þ . Then
f 2 ðfm; Þ ) fþ  > L, so EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ  EUHCðr ¼ f Þ iff
f2  fð2þ Lþ eÞ þ 2 þ Lþ e eL  0 (A4)
Denoting the LHS of (A4) by g(f), it is straightforward to verify that
@g=@f < 0; gðÞ < 0, and gðfmÞ > 0. It follows from the intermediate
value theorem that 9!f 2 ðfm; Þ s.t. gðfÞ ¼ 0. Solving for this unique f,
we obtain
f ¼ 2þ Lþ e
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
L2 þ e2 þ 6eL
p
2
(It is easy to verify algebraically that f 2 ðfm; Þ 8L 2 ½; fm þ Þ, and
that fðLÞjL¼fmþ ¼ f

m.) We conclude that whenever L < f

m þ  and
f  f, a best response ofHC to f 0 ¼ f  is r ¼ 0.
Next, consider the case L  fm þ . There are two cases to consider:
(a) f  L , (b) f > L . In case (a), if LC sets f 0 ¼ f  then HC
updates to ft  U½f ; fþ  and; because f > fm, we know from Case 1
that EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ < EUHCðr ¼ f Þ. Therefore, HC would set r ¼
f 0 if LC sets f 0 ¼ f  (or any f 0 < 0). In case (b), if LC sets f 0 ¼
f  then HC updates to ft  U½f ;LÞ and we have that EUHCðr ¼
0Þ  EUHCðr ¼ f Þ if
eð fÞ
L fþ   f þ
eL
L fþ  (A5)
Now recall that at fm we have
eð fmÞ
2




Note that LHSðA5Þ < LHSðA6Þ and RHSðA5Þ > RHSðA6Þ, so (A5)
cannot hold. Therefore, when L  fm þ  and f > fm; HC’s best response
to f 0 ¼ f  is r ¼ f .
The proof so far has derived the factfinding threshold f specified in the
Proposition, which is a function of L forL < fm þ  and stabilizes at
fm for L  fm þ . We have shown thatHC would not tolerate factfinding
when f > f but would tolerate factfinding at f 0 ¼ f  when f  f. We
conclude that HC’s strategy is a best response when f 0 < 0.
Next, we show that r ¼ 0 is HC’s best response when f 0  0. If u ¼
1 and f 0  0 then, given off-path beliefs, Prðft < 0Þ ¼ 0 and
EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ e ¼ maxUHC. If u ¼ 0 and f > fthen r  f is domi-
nated by r ¼ 0 and; for r > f; EUHC is decreasing in r. By Bayes’ rule
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HC’s posterior is the same as its prior, so EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼
eðþ fÞ=2 > fþ eð fÞ=2 ¼ limx#f EUHCðr ¼ xÞ, so r¼ 0 is a best re-
sponse. If u ¼ 0 and f  f then Prðft < 0Þ ¼ 0, so EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼
e ¼ maxUHC. It follows that r¼ 0 is a best response whenever f 0  0. We
conclude that HC’s strategy is a best response.
Next, we show that LC’s strategy is a best response. If
ft < L; then LC’s strategy is a best response by the same reasoning as in
Case 1. If ft  L and f  f then LC’s strategy of r‘ ¼ 0;u ¼
0 yields ULC ¼ Lþ eþ a. Now consider deviations:
maxULCðu ¼ 1; f 0Þ ¼ Lþ e cþ a;
ULCðr‘ ¼ 0; f 0 < 0Þ ¼
L cþ a if r ¼ 0
f 0  L cþ e if r ¼ f 0 ;

ULC r‘ ¼ f 0; f 0 < 0ð Þ ¼
L c if r ¼ 0
f 0  Lþ e cþ a if r ¼ f 0 ;

and ULC r‘ 62 f0; f 0g; f 0 < 0ð Þ ¼
L c if r ¼ 0
f 0  Lþ e c if r ¼ f 0

.
None of these deviations are profitable, so LC’s strategy is a best
response.
Finally, consider ft  L and f > f. LC’s strategy of r‘ ¼ 0;u ¼ 0
yields ULC ¼ Lþ eþ a. As for deviations, maxULCðu ¼ 1; f 0  0Þ ¼
Lþ e cþ a; ULCðr‘ 6¼ 0;u ¼ 0Þ ¼ Lþ e; and maxULCðf 0 < 0Þ ¼
f 0  Lþ e cþ a. None of these deviations are profitable, so LC’s strat-
egy is a best response. This concludes the proof for Case 2.
Case 3: L < . The proof for when f 2 ½0; Þ is the same as in Case 2.
Focus on f 2 ð; 0Þ. That LC’s strategy is a best response was shown in
the proof of Lemma 1. As for HC, if f 0  0 then Prðft < 0Þ ¼ 0
and EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ e ¼ maxUHC. If u ¼ 1 and f 0 < 0 then, given off-
path beliefs, Prðft < 0Þ ¼ 1 and EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ e ¼ maxUHC. Finally, if
u ¼ 0 then all rule choices except for r ¼ 0 and r ¼ f are dominated.
Consider two cases separately: (a) f < L , (b) f  L . In case (a),
EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ eðfÞ2 > fþ
eðþfÞ
2 ¼ EUHCðr ¼ fÞ. And in case (b),
EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ eðfÞLfþ > fþ eLLfþ ¼ EUHCðr ¼ fÞ. It follows that HC’s
strategy is a best response. We have shown that the strategy-belief profile
in Proposition 2 characterizes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. h
Proposition 3. The following profile of strategies and beliefs character-
izes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game when L  2.
1. If f   or f   then HC sets r ¼ 0 and LC sets r‘ ¼ 0; u ¼ 0.
HC’s beliefs are that Prðft < 0jf  Þ ¼ 0 and Prðft < 0jf 
Þ ¼ 1.
2. If f 2 ð; 0Þ then HC sets r ¼ 0 and LC sets r‘ ¼ 0; u ¼ 0.
HC’s beliefs on path are given by Bayes’ rule.
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Off path,
Prðft < 0ju ¼ 1; f 0 < 0Þ ¼ 1 and Prðft < 0jf 0  0Þ ¼ 0.
3. If f 2 ½0; fm then
. HCsets r ¼ 0 if EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ  EUHCðr ¼ f
0Þ
f 0 if EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ < EUHCðr ¼ f 0Þ

.
In particular, if LC sets f 0 ¼ f  then HC sets r ¼ 0.
. LC sets r‘ ¼ 0; u ¼ 1; f 0 ¼ f .
. HC’s beliefs on path by Bayes. Off path,
Prðft < 0jf 0 ¼ xÞ ¼
0 if x  0
 f
2
if x < 0
8<
: .
4. If f 2 ðfm; Þ then
. HC’s strategy is:
– If r‘ 6¼ 0 then r ¼
0 if f 0  0
f 0 if f 0 < 0

.
– If r‘ ¼ 0 then
r ¼ 0 if f 0  0
r ¼ f 0 if f 0 2 ðf ; 0Þ
r ¼ 0 w=prob: p
f 0 w=prob: 1 p if f




where p ¼ aþcþfaþe‘þf.
. LC sets r‘ ¼ 0 and
– if ft < 0 then
u ¼ 0 w=prob: 1 p1
u ¼ 1; f 0 ¼ f  w=prob: p1

– if ft  0 then
u ¼ 0 w=prob: 1 p2
u ¼ 1; f 0 ¼ f  w=prob: p2







. HC’s beliefs on the equilibrium path are given by Bayes’ rule.
Off path,
Prðft < 0jr‘ 6¼ 0; f 0 < 0Þ ¼ 0, Prðft < 0ju ¼ 1; f 0  0Þ ¼ 0,
Prðft < 0jr‘ ¼ 0; f 0 2 ðf ; 0ÞÞ ¼ Prðft < 0jr‘ ¼ 0; f 0 ¼ f Þ,
and Prðft < 0jr‘ 6¼ 0;u ¼ 0Þ ¼ Prðft < 0jr‘ ¼ 0;u ¼ 0Þ. (The
last two equations indicate that off-path beliefs are the same as
on-path beliefs in analogous situations.)
Proof. The only new result that requires proof is that the parties’ strat-
egies are best responses when f 2 ðfm; Þ (for other values of f, see Case 1
in the proof of Proposition 2). First consider LC’s strategy. For LC to
randomize between not engaging in factfinding and factfinding at f 0 ¼
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f ; HC must set the probability of reversal (given by 1 p) such that
LC would be indifferent between the two choices. SettingULCðr‘ ¼ 0;u ¼
0Þ ¼ EULCðr‘ ¼ 0; f 0 ¼ f Þ and solving for
p yields p ¼ ðaþ cþ  fÞ=ðaþ e‘ þ  fÞ. LC’s expected utility from
this strategy isLþ a. Now consider deviations:
ULCðr‘ ¼ 0;u ¼ 1; f 0  0Þ ¼ L cþ a; ULCðr‘ ¼ 0; f 0 2 ðf ; 0ÞÞ
¼ f 0  L c; ULCðr‘ 6¼ 0;u ¼ 0Þ ¼ L; ULCðr‘ 6¼ 0;u ¼ 1; f 0  0Þ
¼ L c;ULCðr‘ ¼ f 0; f 0 < 0Þ ¼ f 0  L cþ a;
and ULCðr‘ 62 f0; f 0g; f 0 < 0Þ ¼ f 0  L c:
There are no profitable deviations, so LC’s strategy is a best response.
Next, consider HC’s strategy. First consider r‘ ¼ 0; f 0 ¼ f . As be-
fore, all rule choices except for r ¼ 0 and r ¼ f  are dominated. To ran-
domize between r ¼ 0 and r ¼ f ; HC must be indifferent between the
two. Setting EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ EUHCðr ¼ f Þ and solving for LC’s prob-






Prðf 0 ¼ f jft < 0Þ and p2 ¼ Prðf 0 ¼ f jft  0Þ. (It is straightfor-
ward to verify that p2 is a proper probability if p1 is a proper probability,
and that p2 < p1.) We conclude that HC’s strategy is a best response
when r‘ ¼ 0 and f 0 ¼ f .
Next, consider r‘ ¼ 0; f 0 2 ðf ; 0Þ. Given off-path beliefs, HC’s pos-
terior about the distribution of ft is the same as in the last case where
f 0 ¼ f , so EUHCðr ¼ f 0Þ > EUHCðr ¼ f Þ ¼ EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ (where
the inequality follows from the fact that f 0 > f ). Noting that all
choices other than 0 and f 0 are dominated, it follows that r ¼ f 0 is a best
response.
Next, consider r‘ 6¼ 0; f 0 < 0. The necessary and sufficient condition
for r ¼ f 0 to be a best response is EUHCðr ¼ f 0Þ  EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ, which is
to say f 0 þ e  0. It is sufficient to check the inequality at inff 0 ¼ fm  ,
where it is satisfied.
Next, consider r‘ ¼ 0;u ¼ 0. The necessary and sufficient condition for
r¼ 0 to be a best response is EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ  limx#f EUHCðr ¼ xÞ, which is
to say
eð1 p2Þðþ fÞ
ð1 p1Þð fÞ þ ð1 p2Þðþ fÞ
 eð1 p1Þð fÞð1 p1Þð fÞ þ ð1 p2Þðþ fÞ
 f:
Because p1 > p2 and þ f >  f, the inequality is always satisfied.
Next, consider r‘ 6¼ 0;u ¼ 0. Posterior probabilities are the same as in
the previous case, so by the same logic we conclude that r¼ 0 is a best
response. Finally consider u ¼ 1; f 0  0. Given off-path beliefs,
EUHCðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ e ¼ maxUHC. We conclude that HC’s strategy is a best re-
sponse. h
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Derivation of Comparative Statics
To ascertain the impact of parameter changes on factfinding or factfudg-
ing, one must first find expressions for the probability of factfinding or
factfudging in a given equilibrium and then differentiate those expressions
with respect to the parameter of interest. For example, suppose we want
to know how factfinding, factfudging, and helpful factfinding change with
 when L 2 ½; fm þ Þ (Case 2 in Proposition 2). First we verify that when
L 2 ½; fm þ Þ, factfinding occurs iff f 2 ð0; f and ft < L. Then we com-

























































Similar expressions for probabilities of factfinding, factfudging, and
helpful factfinding were found for all regions of L (Cases 1–3 in the proof
of Proposition 2), and the effects of ; eh, and L were obtained by differen-
tiation. Figuring out the sign of the derivative was tedious or tricky in
some cases, but the calculations involve no more than the application of
calculus and algebra.
Proof of Proposition 4. To determine whether LC and HC are better
off with factfinding discretion, I compare their equilibrium utilities in the
present game to equilibrium utilities in a modified setup where LC is obli-
gated to report f 0 ¼ f. In the latter setup, the factfinding component of
LC’s strategy is obligatory; HC has the strictly dominant strategy r¼ 0
(given the distribution of ftjf); and, given HC’s strategy, LC sets r‘ ¼ 0 in
equilibrium. So, the equilibrium strategy profile is the same regardless of
L, and equilibrium utilities can easily be calculated. These are then com-
pared to equilibrium utilities in Proposition 2. For these comparisons, it is
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assumed naturally that f is distributed uniformly on a large interval
aroundH, which I denote by f  U½z; z for some z > 2.20
It is clear that LC is always better off with factfinding discretion than
without. HC is better off with factfinding discretion than without iff
Prðf 2 ðL ; 0Þ \ ft  LÞ þ Prðf 2 ð0; fÞ \ ft < 0Þ
> Prðf 2 ð0; fÞ \ ft 2 ½0;LÞÞ






















which after algebra reduces to ðLÞ
2
2 þ f 
f2
2  Lf > 0. Denoting the
LHS by g(L), note that gð0Þ ¼ 2 > 0 and gðÞ ¼ f2=2 < 0, and it can
be verified that @g=@L < 0. It follows from the intermediate value the-
orem that 9! ~L 2 ð0; Þ such that gðLÞ > 0 for L < ~L and gðLÞ
< 0 for L > ~L. We conclude that HC is better off with factfinding than
without iff L < ~L. h
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Hübert, Ryan. 2019. “Getting Their Way: Bias and Deference to Trial Courts,” 63
American Journal of Political Science 706–18.
Huber, John D. and Nolan McCarty. 2004. “Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and
Political Reform,” 98 American Political Science Review 481–94.
Jacobi, Tonja, and Emerson H. Tiller. 2007. “Legal Doctrine and Political Control,” 23
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 326–45.
Kastellec, John P. 2017. The Judicial Hierarchy. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
Politics. USA: Oxford University Press.
Kornhauser, Lewis A. 1992. “Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine,” 8 Journal of
Law, Economics, & Organization 441–70.
Krishna, Vijay, and John Morgan. 2001. “A Model of Expertise,” 116 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 747–75.
Krishna, Vijay, and John Morgan. 2016. Cheap Talk. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics. London: PalgraveMacmillan.
Lax, Jeffrey R. 2003. “Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion,
Reputation and the Rule of Four,” 15 Journal of Theoretical Politics 61–86.
Lax, Jeffrey R. 2011. “The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine,” 14 Annual Review of
Political Science 131–57.
Lax, Jeffrey R. 2012. “Political Constraints on Legal Doctrine: How Hierarchy Shapes the
Law,” 74 Journal of Politics 765–81.
Mollen, Milton. 1994. Report of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police
Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department. The City of New
York.
Murphy, Walter F., C. Herman Pritchettand Lee Epstein. 2006. Courts, Judges, & Politics:
An Introduction to the Judicial Process. 6th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Note. 1968. “Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics
Cases,”6 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 87–104.
Orfield, Myron W. 1992. “Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts,” 63University of Colorado Law Review 75–161.








 School Library user on 19 O
ctober 2021
Schanzenbach, Max M., and Emerson H. Tiller. 2007. “Strategic Judging under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence,” 23 Journal of Law,
Economics, & Organization 24–56.
Shahshahani, Sepehr. 2015. “The Nirvana Fallacy in Fair Use Reform,” 16 Minnesota
Journal of Law, Science & Technology 273–341.
Slobogin, Christopher. 1996. “Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do about It,” 67
University of Colorado Law Review 1037–60.
Sobel, Joel. 2009. Signaling Games. In Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science.
New York: Springer.
Tiller, Emerson H., and Pablo T. Spiller. 1999. “Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and
Political Games in Administrative Law,” 15 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
349–77.
The Nation, May 8, 1967, pages 596-597.








 School Library user on 19 O
ctober 2021
